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Introduction 
 Anyone familiar with American popular culture and mass media is entirely all too 
familiar with the mantra “thin is in.”  Over the past few decades, a new standard of 
American beauty has imploded on movie and television screens across the nation as 
leading ladies seem to vie for awards premised upon who has the smallest dress size.  
Celebrity magazines routinely praise stars for weight loss and tout the latest fitness trend 
or diet craze among the women of Hollywood.  The public appears hungry for stars that 
are slimmer, trimmer, and thinner than ever before.   
Yet, even the largest appetite has a satiating limit.  The summer of 2005 saw an 
interesting reversal of this trend.   Although the glossy star laden magazines still 
advertised the Hollywood quest for thinness, articles began to appear questioning how 
thin was too thin.1 Apparently, there is a tipping point where an actress’ weight merits 
something resembling concern rather than praise by the media.  This new breed of article 
often involved pictures of (shockingly) thin actresses accompanied by stories raising 
concerns about their health and alleging the possibility of eating disorders.  Coinciding 
with an increase in the nation’s concern with health and health issues, it was no longer 
appropriate for movie stars to project an image that is considered unhealthy for their 
audience of young American women. 
This is one interpretation of the magazine’s intentions; and it is certainly laudable.  
However, the sensational manner of the reporting has led some actresses to protest the 
 
1 See, e.g., Skin & Bones: Why Hollywood Stars go too far, STAR MAGAZINE, available at 
http://www.starmagazine.com/news/61616.
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use of the pictures and the allegations accompanying them.  The accusation, even the 
mere speculation, of having an eating disorder is no small matter, after all.  In November 
of 2005, one actress had decided she had had enough.  After a series of photos appeared 
alongside speculation that the actress was suffering from an eating disorder that had made 
her gaunt and ill-looking, Kate Hudson decided to take legal action.  She authorized a 
British law firm to “begin legal claims for defamation, privacy and data protection 
against media outlets that published photos of Hudson and insinuated that she had an 
eating disorder.”2 The publications in question include celebrity magazines such as the 
Daily Mail, National Enquirer and Star.3
Hudson’s claim of defamation reveals two important things about the reporting: 
1) Hudson alleges that the allegations regarding her weight are false; and 2) that these 
allegations have the potential to economically impact her career by adversely impacting 
her reputation and her marketability as an actress.  Although the articles “suggested that 
she had an eating disorder that was so grave and serious that she was wasting away to the 
extreme concern of her mother and family,”4 her lawsuit implies the effects of these 
allegations to be far more significant in scope.  Not only is her personal life and her 
reputation among her immediate circle affected by the reports, but the weighty 
allegations are also “of commercial and artistic concern to those who might cast her in 
movies and choose to use her image to endorse products.”5 Thus, Hudson’s claim rests 
on the potential impact these stories regarding her weight could have upon her career as 
an actress.  The success of Hudson’s claim, to be heard at the High Court in London in 
 
2 Tim Stack, Monitor: Courts, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, November 18, 2005 at 30. 
3 Kate Hudson files suit over published photos, THE ADVOCATE, November 9, 2005 at A3. 
4 Id. at A3. 
5 Id. at A3. 
Mallik 
 
3
2006,6 will impact not only the importance of weight in Hollywood, but also has 
interesting implications for the role of perceptions of weight in American society. 
Hudson’s defamation suit raises many interesting questions.  But perhaps most 
interestingly, this situation raises implications for the role of the media in shaping both 
defamation law and antidiscrimination law, two seemingly disparate areas of 
jurisprudence that may have more in common that previously understood.  This 
relationship is premised on the notion that the law is not monolithic and static; rather, the 
law is a social institution that shapes and is shaped by society.  As such, areas of the law 
like defamation and antidiscrimination have the potential to reflect social values and 
mores by revealing which actions and behaviors society prohibits through the law and 
which actions and behaviors society chooses to validate.  The development of the law in 
these areas also demonstrates the shifting of social values; as society changes to accept 
new behaviors and reject old notions of propriety and morality, so does the law.   
As reflections of social values and attitudes, this paper explores the connection 
between defamation law and antidiscrimination law.  These two aspects of the law can be 
interpreted together to provide a larger picture of social values generally.  Furthermore, 
they also interact with each other in ways that contribute to the development of both areas 
of the law. 
I.  The Legal Frameworks 
 In order to explore the interactions between these two areas of law, a brief 
discussion of what defamation and antidiscrimination laws look like and mean within 
society is necessary.   
 
6 Id. at A3. 
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A. Defamation law 
Defamation law is a prime example of how law both reflects and shapes social 
values and norms.  Although the exact definition of what constitutes a successful tort 
claim of defamation varies by jurisdiction, the basic elements of a defamation claim are 
generally defined by the Restatement, 2d of Torts as: 
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; 
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; 
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and 
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of the special harm caused by 
the publication. 7
To put it simply, a defamation claim involves a complaint of a materially false statement 
of fact, defamatory in nature, made about the plaintiff and published to a third party with 
fault, resulting in injury to the plaintiff.   
The Restatement also provides some further clarifying points to help decode this 
dense statement. The form of the communication, which the restatement allows to be “by 
innuendo, by figure of speech, by expressions of belief, by allusion or by irony or 
satire,”8 matters less than the way in which the message is received.  In order for a 
statement to be understood as defamatory, it must be understood to be defamatory to the 
individual that the statement was made about, and its false message must be 
comprehended by the reasonable person familiar with the language used.9 As long as 
something is recognized as defamatory by both the individual named and a third party, 
this element of the claim is met.  However, the Restatement also advises that the 
statement must be interpreted within the context in which it appears; thus, a statement 
 
7 RESTAT. 2D OF TORTS, §558 (1977) 
8 Id. at §563(c). 
9 Id. at § 563(b), (c). 
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that appears defamatory on its own may not be when considered within its larger 
context.10 
But what does it mean for a statement to be defamatory?  Again, the Restatement 
provides some guidance.  Statements can be regarded as defamatory “because they tend 
to expose another to hatred, ridicule or contempt.”11 Defamatory statements are often 
thought of as having an adverse impact on an individual’s reputation, but “a defamatory 
communication may tend to disparage another by reflecting unfavorably upon his 
personal morality or integrity or it may consist of imputations which, while not affecting 
another’s personal reputation, tend to discredit his financial standing in the community 
….”12 Defamatory statements have the potential to injure an individual’s sense of her 
self as well as her place within the community, to the extent that “they tend to deter third 
persons from associating” with her.13 If the defamation led to a quantifiable monetary 
loss, such as loss of business or ability to be hired, then the person at whom the statement 
was leveled may be entitled to receive monetary damages as well, revealing another way 
the statements can also affect an individual’s quality of life.14 Finally, it is important to 
note that the defamatory statement need not actually result in any of the above stated 
harms; rather, “it is enough that the communication would tend” to create these harms to 
self and reputation.15 
One last element necessary to establish the tort of defamation makes it especially 
relevant to situations arising within the world of entertainment and media: defamatory 
 
10 Id. at §563(d). 
11 Id. at §559(b) 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at §559(c). 
14 Id. at §559(d). 
15 Id. at §559(e). 
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statements must be communicated to a third party in some way; in other words, it must be 
published.  As the Restatement describes it, “[t]he word ‘communication’ is used to 
denote the fact that one person has brought an idea to the perception of another.”16 
Defamatory statements are false and hurtful statements made about someone to 
somebody else.  Thus, publications such as newspapers and even entertainment glossies 
can serve as vehicles for defamatory statements.  When defamatory statements appear in 
print, they are also referred to as libel; likewise, when the statement is spoken – including 
being spoken in a television or radio program – it is referred to as slander.17 
The construction of the defamatory statement contains many elements, but one 
can see how defamation case law can reveal social attitudes and norms.  A court’s 
decision to recognize certain claims over others on the basis of how damaging the alleged 
defamation is reveals what type of personal characterization our society believes is 
dangerous, or at the very least, unkind to an individual’s reputation.  Words have power, 
and reputations have values; the law of defamation has developed to validate these ideas 
by protecting reputation from harmful libel and slander.  In doing so, defamation law 
reveals classifications and aspects of both personal and group identity that are considered 
repugnant to how an individual is and should be valued by the larger community.   
B. Antidiscrimination Law 
 Antidiscrimination law is another developing area of the law that similarly 
reflects society back on itself.  Developed in large part as a response to the Civil Rights 
Movements of the 1960s and propelled by the message of the 14th amendment, 
antidiscrimination law recognizes rights for individuals based on their membership within 
 
16 Id. at §559(a). 
17 Id. at §568. 
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a certain class.  These classifications, which originally included race and have expanded 
to cover age, religion, marital status, and in some jurisdictions even sexual orientation, 
reflect group identities that are both recognized by society and are validated as deserving 
protections under the law.  Antidiscrimination law prohibits adverse discriminatory 
actions taken against individuals on the basis of these certain group identities.  At the 
heart of antidiscrimination law is the belief that prejudice is not something that is to be 
tolerated in society.  To that end, “[a]ntidiscrimination law seeks to neutralize widespread 
forms of prejudice that pervasively disadvantage persons based on inaccurate judgments 
about their worth or capacities.”18 This reveals two values: both the belief that certain 
groups should be protected from prejudice and discrimination as well as the broader 
value of promoting equality in society.   
 The paradigmatic example of antidiscrimination legislation in form, function and 
interpretation is the Civil Rights Act.  This is the umbrella under which Title VII 
(prohibiting discrimination in the employment context), Title VI (prohibiting racial 
discrimination by institutions which receive federal funding, such as universities) and 
Title VIII (also known as the Fair Housing Act, prohibiting discrimination in access to 
housing) are found.19 These statutes establish groups as deserving of protection from 
discrimination within these contexts because of the nature of that group identity.  The 
ultimate goal is to combat the stigma attached to each of these groups in order to promote 
the ideals of individual worth, fair assessment and equal opportunity within society 
regardless of the stigma and resulting discrimination based on certain identity traits.  
 
18 ROBERT C. POST, THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 10 (2001). 
19 See generally, 42 USCS §2000; 42 USCS §2000e;  42 USCS §2000d.   
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Antidiscrimination law reinforces the idea of which aspects of identity can and should be 
evaluated, and what role those identities should play within larger society. 
 
II. At the intersections of Defamation and Antidiscrimination Law 
 
In general, there are three main ways the two branches of the law could be 
conceived of interacting: recognized defamation claims can reinforce the need for 
antidiscrimination laws for specific classes, defamation claims can reveal where existing 
antidiscrimination law may not be effective enough, and defamation claims can 
sometimes help shape the future developments in antidiscrimination laws by revealing 
new classifications that society may deem to merit antidiscrimination protection. 
The interactions between defamation claims and the group identities that form the 
basis for antidiscrimination laws and collective rights can be understood through the use 
of hypotheticals and case law.  I will now try to illustrate the three major categories of 
these interactions. 
A. Parallelism and Acceptance 
Defamation claims can parallel antidiscrimination law, thereby reinforcing the 
idea that certain groups require protection on the basis of their group identity.  The 
original identity classification that served as the driving force behind early 
antidiscrimination law is that of race.  Indeed, race and ethnicity are the most intricately 
linked with the purpose and design of antidiscrimination laws in public thought; so much 
so that all new rights movement are based at least in part on the race centered Civil 
Rights model.  This model did, after all, make significant headway in terms of helping the 
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passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  Given the nation’s long and uncomfortable history 
with race and racial inequalities, a history that leads to disturbingly persistent disparities 
between racial groups in the nation today, antidiscrimination laws play an important role 
in recognizing the importance of prohibiting racial discrimination in order to achieve a 
true and equal democracy among the American citizenry. 
Defamation law also intersects with issues of race, and in ways which reinforce 
the message sent by antidiscrimination law prohibiting racial discrimination.  One of the 
most salient examples of this is in the role of criminal defamation statutes.  Most states 
have passed legislation criminalizing communications that are defamatory in nature and 
would also threaten to cause a breach of the peace.  This applies to communications made 
defaming entire races through hate literature alleging inferiority or other falsehoods about 
groups based on their race.  The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
review the constitutionality of an Illinois criminal libel statute by balancing the legislative 
construction against the First Amendment protections of speech in Beauharnais v. 
Illinois.20 Beauharnais was the president of a supremacist group called the White Circle 
League in Chicago, and he had developed and distributed a series of pamphlets urging the 
Mayor and Chicago City Council to “halt the further encroachment, harassment and 
invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro ….”21 
He was arrested, charged and convicted under the Illinois criminal libel statute, which 
prohibited declarations such as this one which had the potential to incite public violence.  
In analyzing the issue, the Court looked to Chicago’s long and difficult history with race 
riots and public violence to recognize that it “would deny experience to say that the 
 
20 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
21 Id. at 252. 
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Illinois legislature was without reason in seeking to curb false or malicious defamation of 
racial … groups , made in public placed and by means calculated to have a powerful 
emotional impact on those to whom it was presented.”22 The threat of racial violence was 
and is very real, and the Court recognized the role of legislature in curbing this, finally 
holding the statute to be constitutional in light of the First Amendment.  The Appellate 
Court of Illinois again used the statute in 1964 to uphold the conviction of a group of 
young men who brought on a public disturbance that threatened to turn into a full out race 
riot after passing out anti-Black and anti-Jewish hate literature.23 Misrepresenting an 
entire race of people through defamatory statements does not only raise problematic 
moral concerns, these communications have the serious potential for dangerous public 
violence.  Both defamation law and antidiscrimination law recognize this and work to 
prevent these situations from occurring. 
Defamation claims based on race have the ability to show the salience of racial 
stereotypes and their accompanying stigma, as well as the pervasive existence of racial 
discrimination within society.  In Holden v. American News Co., et al., a White plaintiff 
brought suit against a publication for running a story in which he was described as a 
sympathizer of the Japanese race.24 Although the plaintiff was a known supporter of 
Japanese business interests in the Seattle area, he alleged that the article defamed him by 
portraying him as un-American because of his relationships with both Japanese and 
Japanese American individuals and businesses.  The plaintiff also made a calculation of 
damages that this blow to his reputation had cost him, based upon “his mental suffering 
resulting from the article … [that] he received many phone calls and letters concerning it 
 
22 Id. at 260. 
23 City of Chicago v. Lambert, et al., 47 Ill. App. 2d 151 (1964). 
24 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Washington, 1943). 
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which interfered with his work and that he had received no salary increase since the 
article was published.”25 Context is indeed important to defamation claims, and the court 
found that “[v]iewed by these standards, the libelous character of this publication cannot 
be doubted.  It was published during December, 1942, at a time when, for a year, we had 
been at war with Japan.  Without question, the Japanese race was then hated and reviled 
by the recipients of this magazine.”26 What the court takes so lightly as a basic truth is 
that the stigma associated with being Japanese was so strong that it had serious adverse 
effects even on a White individual who was accused of being sympathetic in some 
manner with this group.  This strong stigma is the grounds for discrimination and other 
acts of hatred and fear, and claims such as this one illustrate the important need for 
existing antidiscrimination law designed to protect racial minorities. 
To put issues of race based defamation into a contemporary context, imagine that 
in the days after September 11, 2001, a local newspaper runs an editorial accusing a 
candidate of Indian descent in a local election of actually being of Middle Eastern 
Background.  The editorial also hints at the possibility of the candidate having ties to 
terrorist organizations.  As a result, the candidate loses the election in a landslide, and 
also finds that his small business in the town suffers.  Let us also assume that our 
wronged candidate decides to bring a defamation claim in state court against the local 
newspaper, and is able to prove all the necessary elements of a libel claim.  This was a 
materially false statement (Indian is not Middle Eastern), the alleged link to terrorists was 
clearly defamatory in nature, and the publication of the statement led to an economically 
measurable injury to reputation in terms of the loss of business and perhaps the potential 
 
25 Id. at 30-31. 
26 Id. at 31. 
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loss of wages the elected position may have provided.  By ruling in favor of the plaintiff, 
the court is validating this claim.  This in turn supports both the local state and federal 
statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.  Defamation 
claims recognize that certain classifications have the potential to seriously damage 
reputations.  When these classifications are based on immutable characteristics such as 
race, the success of the defamation claim reveals the bias and prejudice associates with 
that trait, thus supporting the need for antidiscrimination statutes. 
One last interesting interaction between defamation and antidiscrimination laws 
based on race reveals how, because of the way antidiscrimination statutes have been 
narrowly interpreted by courts in ways that sometimes prevent relief being granted to 
those who complain of discrimination, defamation law may provide an alternative venue.  
One example of this is in cases of racial profiling.  In 1998, John Garret, a Black man, 
was shopping at the local Radio Shack.  Although he was not the only patron at the time, 
he was the only Black patron.  After he left, a computer was reported as stolen from the 
store.  The employees forwarded a description of Garret, but of no other customer who 
was there at the same time, to the local police, who in turn interrogated Garret only to 
find that he had nothing to do with the stolen goods.  Garret then filed suit, alleging racial 
discrimination by the employees of the radio shack as well as defamation; both claims 
were dismissed by the district court.27 On appeal, the court found that the facts were 
insufficient to allege racial discrimination under the standards established by the judicial 
interpretations of the First Circuit; however, the court did find the defamation claim 
 
27 Garret v. Tandy Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Me., 2001). 
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persuasive.28 “An accusation that X ‘suspects’ Y of having committed a crime … is not 
necessarily a non-actionable statement of opinion, but, rather, a statement that implies the 
existence of underlying facts that can be proven true or false (and, thus, potentially 
actionable).”29 What the court found even more persuasive in this case was that the 
allegation of suspected theft seemed to have been made “without a reasonable basis in 
fact”30, but on a suspicion motivated by race.  Racial stereotypes, and the stigma 
associated with them, should not be the basis for snap decisions made about an 
individual.  While both antidiscrimination law and defamation law recognize this, 
defamation law may be able to provide more direct relief. 
B.  Shortcomings and Cultural Shifts 
 A corollary to this parallelism is when successful defamation claims reveal the 
shortcomings of antidiscrimination law, showing where antidiscrimination laws are not 
doing enough to promote equality.  This is often the case with categories that have been 
recognized as deserving protection through antidiscrimination legislation in some 
jurisdictions, but not on a universal basis.  A clear example of such a category is sexual 
orientation.  The rights of individuals based on their status as gay or lesbian is a 
controversial topic which has the potential to polarize the nation, as evidenced by the 
most recent presidential election.31 The very fact that protections based on sexual 
orientation incite such debate reveals the potential for this category to be seen as 
 
28 Garret v. Tandy Corp. d/b/a Radio Shack, 295 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2002). 
29 Id. at 104. 
30 Id. at 106. 
31 See, e.g.., Katherine M. Franke, Sexuality and Marriage: The politics of same-sex marriage politics. 15 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 237 (2006) (“Some have even argued that this issue [of same sex marriage] 
affected, if not determined, the outcome of the 2004 presidential election.”). 
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stigmatized within society.  Therefore, this classification has the potential to form the 
basis of both defamation claims and grounds for antidiscrimination legislation. 
 Hollywood is no stranger to defamation claims based on sexual orientation.  
Although it is debatable whether or not allegations of a certain sexual orientation will 
help or hurt an aspiring actor in the current social milieu, many actors have litigated on 
this type of allegation.  Tom Cruise is a prime example of an actor who has striven to 
maintain the image of a certain sexual orientation in Hollywood, to the point of bringing 
defamation suits in court.  On June 4, 2001, Cruise filed a $100 million dollar lawsuit in 
Los Angeles Superior Court against Bold Magazine publisher Michael Davis.32 Cruise’s 
complaint alleged that Davis had made “false and defamatory written statements” about 
his sexual orientation, including the claim of possession of a videotape featuring Cruise 
engaged in sexual activity with another man.33 Apparently, Davis had released these 
statements to several media outlets, and Cruise was concerned that these rumors “were of 
the sort calculated to cause [Cruise] harm both personally and professionally.”34 This 
was not the first defamation claim of this sort that Cruise had brought; earlier that year in 
May, he had filed another $100 million suit against an adult film actor for allegedly 
telling a French publication that he had been sexually involved with Cruise.35 
Eventually, the suit against Davis settled, with the publisher making a public statement 
retracting the former claims by announcing that Cruise “is not, and never has been, 
 
32 Jason Schossler, Magazine Publisher Admits to Lying About Tom Cruise Videotape, THE 
ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION REPORTER, February 28, 2002. 
33 Cruise Files $100 Million Suit over Gay Rumors, THE ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION REPORTER, June 30, 
2001 at 10. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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homosexual and has never had a homosexual affair.”36 Cruise seemed deeply concerned 
about what the stigma attached with being a homosexual would do to his reputation and 
marketability as an actor; he is clearly aware of the negative consequences associated 
with this classification and wishes to avoid them, even at the expense of litigation.  This 
level of stigma arguably merits antidiscrimination protection. 
 Cruise is not the only individual to bristle all the way to the courthouse over 
allegations of homosexuality.  In October of 1991, The Advocate, a publication that is 
openly marketed towards a gay and lesbian audience, ran a photo editorial on the theme 
of lust.  The pictures and accompanying captions were sexual in nature, and implied both 
homosexuality and certain sexual behaviors of the models used in the pictorial.  This was, 
at least, the basis of the lawsuit brought by James Rejent, one of the models used in the 
magazine.37 Rejent claimed that he was unaware that his pictures would be used in such 
a manner, and complained of defamation because of what was implied from the way his 
image was used in the magazine.  The Supreme Court of New York found in favor of 
Rejent, finding that the nature of the photographs and accompanying captions were such 
that a third party could reasonably impute the “defamatory connotation that plaintiff is 
lustful and sexually promiscuous.”38 The court also looked to the context of the 
communication, and concluded that its appearance in a gay and lesbian publication “only 
heightens the allegedly false and defamatory impression” created by the 
communication.39 The supreme court then goes even further, recognizing that “libelous 
 
36 Schossler, supra note 19. 
37 Rejent v. Liberation Publications, Inc., 197 A.D.2d 240 (1994) 
38 Id. at 243. 
39 Id. at 244. 
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words imputing sexual misconduct to a man have been held to be defamatory per se.”40 
This is an important recognition; for something to be held defamatory per se means that 
the false communication had such potential to have and egregious effect on the individual 
it was leveled against that it will be assumed to be defamatory.  In this case, the court 
appears to interpret “sexual misconduct” as a euonym for homosexuality, revealing the 
stigma associated with sexual orientation as recently as 1994 when this case was decided. 
 Social reactions and attitudes towards homosexuals, as towards any marginalized 
group, shift and change with time, and this shift can be seen in the jurisprudence.  
Although attitudes have been shifting towards a more accepting stance and recognition of 
the need for protection from discrimination against homosexuals, the communication that 
one is gay is still arguably stigmatizing and defamatory.  A 2005 case, Amrak 
Productions, Inc., et al v. Morton, et al, illustrates this.41 In Amrak, a former bodyguard 
of Madonna brought suit against a book publisher for mislabeling a picture of him with 
the singer.  In the book, the caption to the photo described him as a backup singer, who 
the plaintiff alleged was commonly known to be gay.  Thus, the plaintiff alleged that the 
miscaptioning was defamatory; this claim was ultimately unsuccessful, however, in large 
part because the rest of the caption described the individual pictured as Madonna’s 
former lover, thus undercutting any claim of homosexuality.42 The Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit upheld the district court’s holding that “imputing homosexuality cannot 
be considered defamatory per se in Massachusetts,” revealing that the homosexuality is 
not as stigmatic as it was in earlier times and no longer qualifying as a per se violation.43 
40 Id. at 244. 
41 410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005). 
42 Id. at 73. 
43 Id. at 72. 
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However, the court does leave open the possibility of a successful claim alleging the 
defamatory nature of an erroneous communication that an individual is a homosexual if 
the facts establish all the requisite elements of the tort of defamation. 
The responses of the court, as well as of individuals accused of being of a certain 
sexual orientation, are based in the reality of the existence of discrimination along the 
lines of sexual orientation.  These statements would not be regarded as defamatory, either 
by the complaining parties or the deciding courts, if there was no stigma attached to these 
classifications.  The goal of antidiscrimination law in general is to eliminate actions based 
on biases developed in response to certain attributes of individuals.  Thus, certain states 
and local jurisdictions have adopted antidiscrimination statutes on the basis of sexual 
orientation, as well as the more traditional categories of race, gender, religion, etc.  
However, as the above discussed examples show, the existence of antidiscrimination law 
alone may not always be enough to erase the stigma associated with this classification.  It 
is arguable that the law has not gone far enough to cause the requisite shift in societal 
attitudes towards gays and lesbians in order to achieve equality for these classes of 
individuals.  Sexual orientation based defamation claims demonstrate the potential of 
defamation claims to show where antidiscrimination law has not, and maybe cannot, go 
far enough. 
C.  Liminal categories and the future of the law 
 A final interaction between defamation law and antidiscrimination law may be the 
most interesting, as it has the greatest implication for the future of both areas of the law.  
There are certain liminal areas of antidiscrimination law – categories that exist but have 
not yet been recognized for group based protection.  Defamation claims on the basis of 
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certain categories can help illuminate the need for expansion of antidiscrimination law.  
Discrimination and defamation claims based on weight illustrate this interaction.  Studies 
have provided empirical results of discrimination on the basis of weight, making it a 
contender for antidiscrimination statute protection.  Traditionally, the discrimination is 
thought of to be against the overweight, but the converse may also be true.  I will now 
explore this interaction in greater detail.  
 
III. Is thin in?  The (uneasy) marriage between Hollywood at the Fat Acceptance 
Movement 
 
Recently, a slew of Hollywood magazines have run reports on how shockingly 
thin starlets have become.  Weight has become the latest catch-22 for starlets; with each 
new edition of celebrity magazines and tabloids, stars are either criticized for being 
overweight or, now, skeletal.  The new trend of expressing supposed concern over the 
shrinking waistlines of young Hollywood have culminated in certain magazines 
speculating, or outright stating, that certain stars have eating disorders.  Rather than 
chalking it up to the accepted belief that thin is always in, actress Kate Hudson brought a 
defamation suit against several magazines for printing such allegations about her.  The 
basic logic behind her claim is that such misstatements of fact would adversely affect her 
reputation in a way that would hurt her career by decreasing the movie roles she would be 
offered and decreasing her respect in the public’s eye.  If a court were to recognize this 
type of claim, it would be because there is at least an implicit recognition that people are 
discriminated against on the basis of weight and that this discrimination can occur in the 
form of negative impact on one’s reputation.  This would support legal recognition of the 
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existence of a class of people who are discriminated against on the basis of weight and 
would encourage the development of antidiscrimination law to prohibit this.  It is 
interesting to note that Hudson’s suit coincides with a developing fat acceptance 
movement in American society, providing a unique opportunity to witness a potentially 
concurrent and mutually supportive development in both defamation law and 
antidiscrimination law.  New developments in defamation law could encourage the 
expansion and development of antidiscrimination law in this way. 
A. Defamation Analysis 
It may be useful to analyze Hudson’s claim according to the basic elements set 
out by the Second Restatement discussed in Section I.44 If Hudson’s situation could 
satisfactorily establish a claim of defamation, then the law of defamation could in turn 
recognize the stigma and danger to one’s reputation communications regarding weight 
can have for an individual. 
i. A false and defamatory statement concerning another 
A materially false statement lies at the heart of any defamation claim.  In this 
instance, the communicated falsehood is that Hudson has developed an eating disorder, as 
evidenced by the pictures in these publications which portray her as dangerously thin.  
The publications showcasing these images speculate that perhaps she has taken to 
starving herself because of pressure from the industry, or maybe she has taken to binging 
in order to please her fans.  The implication of these speculations is that Hudson has 
become so thin that her health may be in risk.  According to press reports, Hudson also 
takes issue with the fact that the publications allege that she has become so thin as to 
 
44 Although Hudson’s claim was brought in a British court and is therefore subject to British common law, 
I am analyzing it under American standards to see what implications this type of suit, if brought in an 
American court, may have for American antidiscrimination law. 
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cause great concern to her family.45 Thus, the false statements not only apply directly to 
Hudson, they also reign in her family members and others who are close to the actress. 
ii. An unprivileged publication to a third party 
The nature of celebrity, or of any position in the public eye, makes an individual 
susceptible to having their every move dissected by the media in order to satisfy the 
public appetite.  Anything a star does will be displayed to hundreds of thousands of third 
parties, and the vehicles for these communications are often the types of magazines 
involved in Hudson’s lawsuit.46 This only heightens the danger of the consequences of 
defamatory statements that appear amongst those glossy pages; the general public may 
become aware of the statement and unquestioningly believe the truth of it.  This is made 
more so because the nature of the publications and the size of the market they reach 
completely undermine any claim of an existing protecting privilege.  Indeed, the very 
public nature and the scope of the audience for these communications may help Hudson’s 
claim. 
iii. Fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher 
If a publisher knows that its publication is the vehicle for many communications 
about an individual to an extremely large audience, then it can be argued that the 
publisher has a duty to make sure the statements are at best true, and at the very least, not 
harmful.  Hudson will have to show that the publishers that chose to run the stories about 
her alleged eating disorder did so in at least a negligent fashion.  She might do this by 
showing that they failed to research the validity of their statements, or that the photos 
were not properly captioned.  The negligence issue will turn on how reliable the 
 
45 See supra note 3, at A3. 
46 Id. at A3 (publications include Daily Mail, National Enquirer, Heat, Closer and Star). 
Mallik 
 
21
information published was, how reliably it was presented, and how dangerous the harm to 
Hudson really was. 
iv. Either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the 
existence of special harm caused by the publication 
In order for the tort of defamation to be established, there must have been some 
cognizable harm caused by the communication.  Words can have power, and defamation 
law has developed in recognition of this truism.  In order for a false communication to be 
actionable, then, it must have caused a harm by its publication to a third party.  In this 
instance, Hudson’s claim of harm is twofold, both relating to harm to her reputation.47 
First, there was a harm to her immediate circle of family, loved ones and other people 
close to Hudson.  Although this does not directly translate into a monetary value, this is 
certainly a harm.  The second harm is more tangible; Hudson is concerned that these 
reports will affect her reputation as an actress “to those who might cast her in movies and 
choose to use her image to endorse products.”48 As an actress, Hudson’s marketability 
depends in large part on her public image.  These false statements have the serious 
potential to hamper her economic success within her chosen profession.  This is the type 
of situation defamation law seeks to prohibit.  Furthermore, this harm to her professional 
credibility may also serve as grounds for monetary damages, which may be significant 
given Hudson’s usual salary per picture or per endorsement deal. 
Hudson’s situation could potentially satisfy all the necessary elements needed to 
establish defamation according to the Second Restatement definition.  If the court were to 
recognize such a claim and find in favor of Hudson, this would also lend support to and 
 
47 See Stack, supra note 2, at 30. 
48 Supra note 3, at A3. 
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recognition of the powerful stigma attached with issues of weight and the negative 
consequences of being mislabeled as a weight deviant within society. 
B. Antidiscrimination Analysis 
When I use the term “weight deviant,” I am relying on an understanding that there 
is a normative standard of what is considered an appropriate or healthy weight to be.  The 
ability of an individual to conform to this standard thus affects the way he or she is 
treated by society as a whole; the closer one is to the normative weight standard, the more 
one is rewarded.  A weight deviant, then, is removed from the standard by being too far 
away in either direction, by being too thin or too fat.49 These individuals experience the 
stigma that arises from deviance from the norm.  This experience has founded a new 
movement within American society that analogizes this stigma with that experienced by 
other minorities in order to embark on a new rights recognition movement.  This 
movement has been called the fat acceptance movement and follows organizing models 
such as those used for racial groups and groups based on sexual orientation in order to 
campaign for rights recognition in order to combat the stigma.50 
One of the major difficulties facing any nascent rights movement is that rights are 
recognized somewhat grudgingly.  If this were not the case, then the need for collective 
action such as seen in the Civil Rights movement would not be accepted as necessary, nor 
would that movement serve as a model for all new movements.  While it appears that 
society has accepted that discrimination based on race is invalid, and seems to be 
approaching a similar acceptance regarding discrimination on the basis of sexual 
 
49 I want to emphasize the fact that I do not want to imply anything pejorative by using the term deviant; 
rather, it is an acknowledgement that society often places those outside the norm in a pejorative context 
with negative consequences. 
50 See Abigail C. Saguy and Kevin W. Riley, Weighing Both Sides: Morality, Mortality, and Framing 
Contests over Obesity, 30 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL. AND L. 869 (2005). 
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orientation, such an embrace of fat rights or other rights based on appearance has not 
emerged.  The public response to a recent antidiscrimination statute established by the 
city of Santa Cruz, California illustrates this.  In 1992, the City Council proposed an 
antidiscrimination statute that prohibited discrimination on the basis of physical 
appearance altogether.51 In trying to stay in line with the history of antidiscrimination 
law as premised upon the logic that immutable characteristics should not be punished 
through discriminatory behavior, “the Santa Cruz Ordinance proscribed discrimination 
based only on aspects of bodily appearance that were beyond a person’s control.”52 The 
national public response to the statute varied, but a general theme was that the council 
had simply gone too far.  The ordinance was referred to by derogatory names such as the 
“purple hair ordinance” and the “ugly ordinance,” revealing a public belief that not all 
aspects of identity should receive antidiscrimination protections.53 
Where, then, does the fat acceptance movement, also more generally labeled as 
the size acceptance movement, enter the scene of modern antidiscrimination protection?  
Certain attempts have been made to organize around a disability model; the logic is that if 
fatness (and thinness by logical extension) is recognized by the courts as a disability, then 
it could fall under the Americans with Disabilities Act and gain acceptance, protection 
and accommodation in that way by building off of the disability rights model.54 Other 
size acceptance activists have argued against this, supporting instead antidiscrimination 
 
51 Santa Cruz, Cal., Mun. Code §§9.83.01, 9.83.02(13) (1992). 
52 See. POST, supra note 18, at 7. 
53 WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 65-66 (1995). 
54 See, e.g., Anna Kirkland, Representations of Fatness and Personhood: Pro-Fat Advocacy and the Limits 
and Uses of Law, 82 REPRESENTATIONS 24 (2003)(analyzing the uses and limits of the disability model for 
the size acceptance movement.) 
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statutes that would provide protections from discrimination against individuals on the 
basis of their size, generally.   
Defamation law may actually lend support to either of these antidiscrimination 
models.  One of the major challenges in gaining acceptance of a rights movement is in 
countering public beliefs that such rights and protections are unnecessary.  In the case of 
size and weight acceptance movements, this means countering public opinion that there is 
either no stigma attached with weight or that the stigma attached is minor and has no real 
affect on the material reality of a weight deviant.  Successful defamation suits based on 
weight show that this is simply not the case.  Weight deviancy is attached with a stigma 
that can lead to personal and emotional harm that extends beyond an individual to one’s 
social circle of family, friends and acquaintances.  That stigma can even lead to economic 
consequences as weight deviants experience harm to their reputation that translates into 
discrimination in employment opportunities.  If there is the potential that a mere 
communication of an allegation that an individual is a weight deviant could harm an 
individual’s reputation to the extent that a cognizable defamation claim arises, that 
potential arises from the fact that there is a very clear stigma associated with weight 
deviancy and that stigma has very real negative consequences.  It is these consequences 
of stigma and bias that antidiscrimination law is designed to prohibit; therefore, 
defamation suits premised on weight can support the expansion of the conception of 
antidiscrimination law to recognize weight discrimination. 
Conclusion 
Initially, the relationship between antidiscrimination law and defamation law may 
not appear to be obvious.  An even more searching inquiry may be what this supposed 
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relationship has to do with the current battles between Hollywood actresses and the 
media over issues of weight.  However, as Kate Hudson’s lawsuit suggests, the current 
furor among starlets over allegations of eating disorders and disturbing weight loss 
provides a frame in which to showcase the potentially rich interactions between 
defamation suits and the development of antidiscrimination law. 
Both defamation law and antidiscrimination law reveal societal values and mores.  
They are examples of attempts by the law to regulate behavior; they communicate 
messages about how we should treat our fellows.  Both are deeply concerned with 
notions of stigma that are associated with aspects of an individual’s identity.  Both 
recognize that this stigma can have serious negative material consequences in the lives of 
these individuals and, where appropriate, both areas of the law function to combat these 
consequences.  In defamation law, appropriateness is determined by the falsity of a 
statement alleging the identity that created the stigma.  In antidiscrimination law, 
appropriateness turns on the type of identity and whether or not we as a society feel that 
the resulting stigma is fair and sufficiently harmful to the individual’s ability to fully 
function within our democratic society. 
When analyzed along the lines of the type of identity at the center of the claims, 
both antidiscrimination law and defamation law are seen to overlap and interact in ways 
that support each other in fighting against stigma.  They reinforce societal notions of 
aspects of identity that are dangerously stigmatized in society; aspects such as race, 
sexual orientation and even weight.  In this manner, the two areas of the law share an 
aspirational quality in that they are both working to establish a conception of society in 
which stigma based on these identities is no longer permitted.  While this is more of an 
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explicit goal of antidiscrimination law, it may actually be defamation law, with its 
broader scope and ability to quantify the harm resulting from stigmatized identities in 
terms of monetary damages, that has the greatest potential in illuminating new directions 
for antidiscrimination protection.  Defamation law concretizes the basic theory 
underlying discrimination law by clearly establishing the harm created by certain 
identities.  It is then the role of antidiscrimination law to expressly prohibit those harms 
by forbidding discrimination on the grounds of that identity.  Together, these two 
seemingly disparate areas of the law can interact to shape a more equal American society.  
Not even a movie star could object to that. 
 
